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The collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund  (ODGF) in March 1985 
provides a laboratory for examining the financial market's belief in the 
incentive-conflict  model proposed by Kane  (1989).  Research in this area has 
yet to examine the stock returns of federally insured institutions during 
that period in the context of this model.  Thus, it has not addressed the 
question of whether financial-market  participants recosnize the implications 
of the model; that is, whether they anticipate the bailouts it implies. 
This paper fills that void. 
We find that, on average, stocks of firms insured by the poorly 
capitalized Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) do 
reasonably well during the 41-day  event window centered on the ODGFfs  Bank 
Holiday, while stocks of firms insured by the relatively well capitalized 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporations (FDIC) do not.  More important, 
differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms are consistent with 
a reaffirmation of the incentive-conflict  model. 
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The collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (ODGF) in March 1985, 
triggered by the failure of E.S.M. Securities (ESM),  is the most visible of 
a series of events that disrupted financial markets in early 1985.  Among 
other effects, this incident challenged the credibility of federal 
government deposit guarantees.  While others such as Cooperman, Lee, and 
Wolfe  (1992)  have analyzed the effect of this crisis on securities such as 
retail certificates of deposit, the implications of the ODGF1s  failure for 
stockholders of federally insured institutions and taxpayers have not been 
fully explored.  This paper examines the stock returns of two distinct 
classes of financial institutions: those insured by the relatively well 
capitalized Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)  and those insured 
by the relatively weak Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC).  This lets us gauge investors' perceptions of the relative strength 
of different government guarantees. 
In addition, although the ODGF crisis occurred in 1985, this study is 
more than simply an historical analysis.  That crisis provides a laboratory 
for examining the financial market's belief in Kane's  (1989) contention that 
self-interested  management and politicians have powerful incentives to make 
uninsured depositors whole.  Kane and Kaufman (1992) report that the 
incentive-conflict  model explains events surrounding a similar crisis in 
Australia, but they do not examine the stock returns of affected 
institutions.  Thus, they do not address the separate question of whether 
financial-market  participants recognized the model's  implications; that is, 
whether they anticipated the bailouts implied by the model.  This paper 
fills that void. 
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incorporate the value of deposit guarantees in the market value of the 
firm's equity.  If investors believed that the effects of the ODGF crisis 
were confined to members of the ODGF, or that both the FDIC and the FSLIC 
could easily weather the storm  (perhaps  by drawing on implicit government 
guarantees), then the stocks of federally guaranteed institutions would show 
no effect.  If,  in contrast, they believed that the crisis signaled a 
weakness in the federal government's resolve to honor those guarantees, then 
the stock returns of insured institutions should reflect that assessment, 
and firms insured by the decapitalized FSLIC should suffer more than their 
FDIC-insured  counterparts.  Larger declines by FSLIC-insured  institutions 
could also result from a belief that the influx of ODGF thrifts to FSLIC 
would reduce confidence in federal guarantees or lead to higher insurance 
premiums. 
Finally, if investors viewed the ODGF crisis as reaffirming the 
incentive-conflict  model, thereby signaling continued regulatory forbearance 
and a strengthening of implicit guarantees, the stock returns of FSLIC firms 
could exceed those of their FDIC counterparts.  This is because reaffirming 
FDIC guarantees would have been relatively unimportant compared to 
reaffirming FSLIC guarantees.  Better-capitalized  depository institutions 
would also lose from continued forbearance, because insolvent institutions 
would continue to compete away lending margins.  To the extent that FDIC- 
insured banks were better capitalized than FSLIC-insured  firms, the former's 
stocks would have a less positive reaction to the government's handling of 
the ODGF.  This interpretation implies that investors do not view the events 
predicted by the incentive-conflict  model as a certainty.  That is, they 
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that capital forbearance will probably continue, but that neither outcome is 
inevitable. 
Our results show that the ODGF crisis produced much information 
important to financial markets, and that it did indeed have different 
impacts, depending on the insurer.  On average, FSLIC firms did reasonably 
well during a 41-day  event window centered on the ODGFrs  Bank Holiday, while 
FDIC firms did not.  Stockholders of FDIC-insured  firms began to absorb 
losses 19 days prior to the Bank Holiday.  They also lost rather heavily 
during a two-day  event period consisting of the Bank Holiday and the day 
before, and during the days shortly after.  By comparison, though, FSLIC- 
insured thrifts lost early in the 41-day  event window, began to recover 
about seven days before the Bank Holiday, and on average gained more than 
2.1% during the event window.  More important, differences in abnormal 
returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms were consistent with a reaffirmation of the 
incentive-conflict  model.  When government authorities moved towards a 
bailout of the ODGF, stock returns on FSLIC-insured  institutions exceeded 
those of FDIC-insured  institutions.  When authorities sold off entry 
privileges to out-of-state  banks, the relationship was reversed. 
This paper is organized as follows:  The next section states our 
hypotheses and describes our method and data.  Section I11 reports the 
results.  Section IV summarizes our findings. 
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We test the following groups of hypotheses, each group predicting 
different stock-return  behavior for institutions insured by the FSLIC and 
the FDIC: 
1.  Financial-market  participants viewed the guarantees of the 
FSLIC and FDIC as a) comparable, or b) at least sufficient to 
weather the information released during the ODGF crisis. 
2. Financial-market  participants a) considered the credibility of 
FSLIC guarantees to be weakened by the crisis, or b) feared an 
influx of weak ODGF thrifts to the FSLIC that might lead to 
higher insurance premiums. 
3. Financial-market  participants viewed the ODGF crisis as a) 
increasing the likelihood of a federal bailout of the FSLIC 
fund, or b) reaffirming regulatory forbearance, in accordance 
with the incentive-conflict  model. 
Hypothesis 1 implies that abnormal returns on the stocks of FDIC- 
insured institutions would not differ significantly from those of their 
FSLIC counterparts.  Hypothesis 2 implies that abnormal returns on the 
stocks of FSLIC-insured  institutions would be lower than those of FDIC- 
insured firms.  Finally, to the extent that investors view government 
bailouts as uncertain, Hypothesis 3 implies that abnormal returns on the 
stocks of FSLIC-insured  institutions would be higher than those of FDIC- 
insured firms.  Reaffirming regulatory forbearance for FDIC institutions is 
unimportant compared to a similar reaffirmation for those insured by the 
decapitalized FSLIC. 
Method 
We apply a variant of the method used by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) to 
obtain our event-study  results.  Their approach uses the single-index  market 
model to obtain predicted returns, standardizes the resulting prediction 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmerrors, and constructs a Z-statistic  to determine the statistical 
significance of these standardized prediction errors.  Because the equities 
of financial institutions are in general more sensitive to interest rates 
than other stocks,  we augment the market model with the yield on ten-year 
government bonds, as suggested by Stone (1974).  We estimate the parameters 
of the market model using returns from 180 days prior to the event through 
21 days prior to the event.  The event-period  window begins 20 days before 
the event date and continues until 20 days after it.  The estimation 
equation is: 
where 
R  =  return on security j on day t, 
jt 
Rmt 
=  return on the equal-weighted  portfolio, with dividends, provided 
I  by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),  on day t, 
Yt 
=  the yield on ten-year  government bonds, and 
1. Brown and Warner  (1980) report that a value-weighted  index is more prone 
to problems than the equal-weighted  index we use, and that using the equal- 
weighted index led to no major difficulties.  To check our results, we 
replicated portions of our study using a value-weighted  index with no 
important differences.  In their later paper (19851,  Brown and Warner 
report that even extreme event clustering has relatively little impact, 
although with similar industry groups some methods tend to reject the null 
of no abnormal performance too often.  Using the two-index  model in this 
paper helps to minimize this potential problem, and Brown and Warner  (1985) 
report that using more complex approaches could result in potentially large 
losses in power.  Most important, corrections for event clustering adjust 
the standard error of the abnormal returns,  not the abnormal return itself. 
Given that our paper's main focus is the differences between FDIC and FSLIC 
institutions,  event clustering is not likely to be a problem. 
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j  t 
We calculate announcement-period  prediction errors (PE  )  using the 
j  t 
estimated coefficients a  pj, and y  in equation (I):  I  j 
PE  =  R  -  (a.  +  pj~mt  +  yjYt)  jt  jt  3 
We calculate standardized prediction errors (SPEs)  by dividing each 
abnormal return in equation (2)  by an estimate of its standard error: 
SPE  =  PEjt /  Sjt, 
j  t 
where 
In equation (4),  V?  equals the residual variance of firm j  's augmented 
3 
market-model  regression given by equation (11,  ED equals the number of days 
in the estimation period, and R  equals the mean market-model  return during  m 
the estimation period. 
If the Ohio Bank Holiday had no effect on the stock returns of the 
financial institutions in our sample, these SPEs are not statistically 
different from zero.  If investors perceived this event to be favorable 
(unfavorable)  to these institutions, then the SPEs are significantly 
positive (negative).  To form multiday Z-statistics,  we sum the standardized 
daily returns for each firm across the observation period, average them 
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is the number of firms. 
A variation of the Mikkelson and Partch approach ([19861, hereafter MP) 
has been developed by Boehmer, Musumeci and Paulsen ([19911, hereafter BMP), 
who call their variation the standardized-cross-section  method and provide 
evidence that it is robust to a variety of statistical  problems, including 
event clustering.  Because all firms in our sample experience the same event 
date, we also use the BMP method.  However, this method does not generalize 
to multiday return intervals, and BMP report that the MP approach also works 
well.  Consistent with this, we find that results from the BMP approach and 
the MP method do not differ substantially for one-day  event windows.  More 
important for our purposes, prediction errors from equation (2) are the same 
for both methods, so tests comparing them for FDIC and FSLIC institutions 
are not affected.  Therefore, we concentrate the present analysis on results 
obtained from the MP approach.  The BMP results are available on request. 
Data 
All of our tests use daily stock-return  data from the tapes supplied by 
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP)  at the University of 
Chicago.  we include firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the 
American Stock Exchange, and those traded over the counter.  Of these, 123 
are FDIC insured, 66 are FSLIC insured, and one is insured by the Maryland 
2  Savings-Share  Insurance Corporation (MSSIC)  . 
2. We exclude firms with more than 40 missing returns during the estimation 
period, those with more than 10 consecutive missing returns, and those with 
a missing return on either the event date or the day before.  We treat the 
MSSIC thrift as an FSLIC institution because excluding it leads to similar 
results. 
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The appendix presents an abbreviated list of important political events 
during the 41-day  event window surrounding March 15,  1985.  A more complete 
listing is available on request.  On Thursday, February 28,  Alexander Grant 
&  Co.,  an outside auditor,  released ESMrs  1984 financial statements, only to 
withdraw them the next day, Friday,  March 1, which was the final day that 
ESM was open.  Because auditors spent the weekend studying the firm's  books, 
it seems likely that news of its problems surfaced that Friday.  After ESM 
failed, inflicting a loss of $150 million on Home State Savings (compared  to 
the ODGFrs  net worth of about $136 million), the most likely dates for 
abnormal returns are Wednesday, March 6 (the first day of heavy runs at Home 
State Savings) and Wednesday, March 13 (when the Ohio legislature 
insufficiently recapitalized the ODGF)  .  After the Bank Holiday on Friday, 
March 15,  when the State of Ohio refused to put its full faith and credit 
behind the ODGF, key dates include Monday, March 18 through Wednesday, 
March 20.  On that Monday, the state legislature passed a bill requiring 
ODGF thrifts to obtain federal insurance before reopening.  On Tuesday, the 
FSLIC promised to speed applications from ODGF thrifts, but imposed higher 
capital standards on these applications.  On Wednesday, the state 
legislature rescued the ODGF. 
Table 1 contains the event-study  results using the FDIC firms.  The 
first two columns represent the calendar dates of the event period and the 
days in event time (relative  to March 15).  The next two columns list the 
daily average abnormal return (AAR)  and the MP Z-statistic. The percentage 
of positive abnormal returns is next, followed by a binomial 2-statistic  to 
determine the statistical significance of that value.  Note that this test 
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SO%, because stock returns are not equally likely to be positive or 
negative.  To control for this, our binomial statistic tests against the 
null hypothesis that the percentage of positive returns is the same as that 
5  during the estimation period.  Here, that value is 41.2%.  The last column 
of the table lists the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for all 123 firms. 
Table 1 also contains five sets of multiday statistics.  These five are 
for the two-day  event window encompassing day -1  and day 0,  two six-day 
windows  (from day -5 to day 0 and from day 1 to day 6), and two eleven-day 
windows  (from day -10  to day 0 and from day 1 to day 11).  In all cases, we 
also report Z-statistics  testing the hypothesis that these returns do not 
differ statistically from zero.  The longer observation windows are 
particularly valuable in studies of financial crises such as that involving 
the ODGF, which spanned several days. 
Table 1 shows that a great deal of information reached the financial 
markets around this time.  The MP  Z-statistic  is significant 12 of 41 
times.4  The binomial Z-statistic  is significant six times.  Figure 1 
graphs the daily AAR and CAR for Table 1.  There is no obvious trend in 
daily AARs, though the preponderance of negative values leads to a downward 
trend in the CAR beginning on day -19  and extending through day 10 before 
3. This does not extend to binomial tests of two-day  abnormal returns, 
because there is more than one way to pair the days, and the results could 
differ depending on the choice of pairs.  Therefore, the proportion of 
positive two-day  abnormal returns is tested against 0.5. 
4. Readers will note that the abnormal return and the MP  Z-statistic 
sometimes have opposite signs, which is possible using this approach.  Also, 
some care is needed when interpreting the event-study  results because of 
potential problems with event clustering. 
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basis points. 
Although many events during this time suggest themselves as likely to 
generate abnormal returns, and the event-study  results reveal that this was 
a time of rapid information release, the events identified in the media 
rarely seem to be the cause of the individual daysf  abnormal returns.  For 
example, the court-ordered  closure of ESM on March 4  generates a positive 
abnormal return, which is significant according to the binomial test. 
Conceivably, this represents a flight to quality, benefiting federally 
insured dealers in government securities, largely FDIC-insured  banks.  This 
is consistent with March 1:  If ESM's  problems leaked and caused a flight to 
quality, then we would expect to observe positive abnormal returns on that 
date, as well.  A flight to quality can also explain the positive  (although 
insignificant) abnormal return on March 6, the day of heavy runs on Home 
State. 
A flight to quality cannot, however, explain the observed results for 
March 15 and March 18-20. The Bank Holiday itself leads to significantly 
negative abnormal returns, and the Ohio legislature's action on March 18, 
requiring ODGF thrifts to obtain federal insurance, also leads to negative 
(though insignificant) returns.  The FSLICfs  promise to speed the 
application process for ODGF thrifts leads to significant losses on Tuesday, 
March 19, and the formal rescue of the ODGF the next day leads to 
insignificantly negative abnormal returns.  A flight to quality is 
inconsistent with the four consecutive losses, totaling almost 72 basis 
points, by institutions insured by the relatively strong FDIC. 
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promised to expedite new insurance applications on March 19.  One view of 
this result is that investors interpreted the FSLIC action as signaling 
continued regulatory forbearance,  to the detriment of well-capitalized 
institutions.  Continued forbearance would mean that undercapitalized and 
insolvent firms would remain supercompetitors in the sense of Kane's  (1989) 
zombie institutions.  These firms,  with little or nothing more to lose, 
would continue to bid down spreads on investments for healthy institutions. 
The multiday statistics in Table 1 present a less complex picture. 
FDIC firms lose almost 30 basis points during the two-day  event window 
encompassing day -1  and day 0,  16.6 basis points during the six-day  period 
prior to and including the Bank Holiday, and a statistically significant 
49.4 basis points during the six-day  period beginning the day after the Bank 
Holiday.  For the eleven-day  window prior to and including the Bank Holiday, 
FDIC-insured  institutions gain an insignificant 19.4 basis points, but this 
is offset by a loss of almost 34 basis points during the following 11 
trading days.  In brief, the stocks of FDIC-insured  institutions suffer 
losses that are both statistically and economically significant on the Bank 
Holiday and during the period shortly thereafter. 
Table 2 presents the results for FSLIC-insured  thrifts.  Only two days 
(February  26 and April 8) show significantly negative abnormal returns 
(compared  to seven for FDIC institutions), and even a casual glance at the 
CAR reveals that these institutions did better than their FDIC-insured 
counterparts.  As Figure 1 shows for FDIC institutions, the CAR turns 
negative very early in the event window and remains negative, finishing at 
-0.395%. In contrast, Figure 2 reveals that FSLIC firms have negative CARS 
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the event itself,  the CAR finishes at a positive 2.137%.  Further, there are 
no negative multiday prediction errors for FSLIC institutions.  FDIC firms 
suffer statistically significant losses on the event day and after, whereas 
FSLIC firms enjoy statistically significant gains during the 11-day  period 
preceding the Bank Holiday, and still more gains thereafter. 
However, a formal test of the hypothesis that the daily abnormal return 
of FDIC-insured  firms is equal to that of firms insured by the FSLIC is 
somewhat inconclusive.  We conduct both a t-test  and the nonparametric 
median test, each using all observations on abnormal returns from all 
institutions.  The t-statistic  is -1.21,  which is not significant, while the 
statistic for the median test is -4.34,  which is significant at the 1% 
level.  We note that about a quarter of the observations in these tests 
precede the failure of ESM; there is no obvious reason for observations from 
this period to be different across insurers.  Using observations beginning 
on the date of ESM1s  closing, the t-statistic  is -1.61,  which just misses 
significance at the 10% level, and the statistic for the median test is 
3.71,  which remains significant. 
There is further evidence that financial-market  participants 
distinguished between FDIC-  and FSLIC-insured  institutions:  The difference 
between the abnormal returns of these groups is statistically reliable on 
seven days.  The rightmost column of Table 2 presents t-tests  of the 
difference between the abnormal returns on FDIC-  and FSLIC-insured 
institutions.  On four days the abnormal returns on FSLIC firms exceed those 
on FDIC institutions, and on three days the ranking is reversed.  Further, 
most of the differences, especially those occurring after ESM failed and the 
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appropriate size and sign. 
For example, on March 12 the Federal Reserve agreed to help ODGF 
institutions prepare the documents necessary for FSLIC insurance.  If 
financial markets interpreted this as signaling continued regulatory 
forbearance, FSLIC thrifts would be expected to benefit more than those 
insured by the solvent FDIC.  Indeed, abnormal returns on the stocks of 
FSLIC-insured  thrifts were statistically larger than those of their FDIC- 
insured counterparts on March 12.  On April 4,  the Ohio legislature 
considered an $85 million guarantee to prospective buyers of Home State, 
which probably signaled an impending bailout of the ODGF, as predicted by 
the incentive-conflict  model.  This, too, would have reaffirmed the implicit 
guarantee behind the insolvent FSLIC, and, as on March 12,  average stock 
returns on FSLIC institutions were better than on their FDIC counterparts. 
The incentive-conflict  model also predicts that politicians are likely 
to sell off entry privileges as the result of a crisis.  The Ohio 
legislature did indeed open the state to interstate banking, but not until 
October 1988,  well after the end of our event window.  However, the Maryland 
state legislature approved a bill on ~pril  8,  1985 that allowed out-of-state 
banks to set up full-service  banks in Maryland.  One would expect this to 
cause the stock returns of FDIC-insured  institutions to exceed those of 
FSLIC-insured  thrifts.  This is indeed the case:  The t-statistic  testing 
the difference in abnormal returns is 3.49, the most significant of all 
dates in the sample. 
The difference in abnormal returns on  April 15 is also readily 
explained, although not by events related to the ODGF.  On April 15 the 
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recommend curbs on thrifts' junk-bond  holdings.  Not surprisingly, FSLIC 
institutions on average did worse than FDIC institutions on that day. 
These results are not due to outliers,  nor are they due to 
distributional properties of the returns.  Deleting the most extreme outlier 
in these seven cases eliminates statistical significance only once, on 
March 12.  Using the nonparametric Wilcoxon test, abnormal returns on FDIC 
institutions differ from FSLIC thrifts eight times instead of seven. 
Of the three groups of hypotheses we consider, the incentive-conflict 
model is most consistent with the relatively strong performance of FSLIC 
institutions compared to that of their FDIC counterparts during the Ohio 
thrift crisis.  According to this interpretation, the events of the period 
reaffirm the federal government's implicit backing of the FSLIC fund, as 
would be consistent with the incentive-conflict  model.  The FSLIC was widely 
suspected to be insolvent by March 1985; the FDIC was strong by comparison. 
Even if investors believed the predictions of the incentive-conflict  model, 
they likely retained at least some doubt as to the strength of the 
government's backing of the FSLIC fund.  However, after the State of Ohio 
rescued the ODGF, which it was not legally required to do, investors 
probably viewed the federal government's implicit guarantee of the FSLIC to 
be much stronger than before. 
This interpretation does require that investors not place complete 
confidence in the incentive-conflict  model.  That is, implicit guarantees 
and taxpayer-funded  bailouts may be natural outgrowths of elected officials' 
incentives to delay recognizing problems and to shift costs to the taxpayer, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbut they are not considered inevitable, nor are depositors certain to be 
made whole. 
This interpretation gains force because data constraints require us to 
select stock institutions; we obviously cannot examine the stock returns of 
mutual institutions.  Given the year when the ODGF crisis occurred,  most of 
our sample thrifts were likely to be recent conversions from mutual to stock 
charters.  Recent conversions probably have stronger capital positions than 
do thrifts in general.  If the market viewed the ODGF crisis as increasing 
the likelihood that the federal government would continue to forbear and to 
ignore the growing thrift-industry  problems, it could reasonably expect such 
forbearance to act as a tax on better-capitalized  firms, regardless of 
insurer, as zombie institutions would remain supercompetitors.  Despite this 
and despite the unavoidable selection bias towards better-capitalized 
thrifts, our sample of FSLIC-insured  thrifts enjoys higher stock returns 
than does our FDIC-insured  sample. 
IV. Slmmary and  Cauclusiaus 
This paper explores the effect of the collapse of the Ohio Deposit 
Guarantee Fund on insured financial institutions.  We find evidence that 
this crisis produced much information important to financial markets, and, 
more important, that the markets treated FSLIC-insured  thrifts differently 
from FDIC-insured  institutions.  FSLIC-insured  thrifts enjoyed statistically 
significant,  positive abnormal returns during the 11-day  period prior to and 
including the Bank Holiday; FDIC institutions lost during the six-day  period 
including and after the Bank Holiday.  The cumulative average residual of 
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figure is -0.395%. 
These results might seem counterintuitive,  because by 1985 the FSLIC 
was widely recognized to be insolvent.  One might have expected the stocks 
of FDIC firms to perform better than their FSLIC counterparts as investors 
fled to safer investments.  We find the opposite.  We argue that our finding 
is consistent with Kane's  (1989) incentive-conflict  model, which asserts 
that taxpayer-funded  bailouts are a natural outgrowth of the moral-hazard 
problem that taxpayers face.  Elected officials have incentives to delay 
recognition of problems and to shift costs to the taxpayer.  The state 
bailout of the ODGF might have illustrated this point to investors, who 
revised their estimates of the federal government's intentions to continue 
capital forbearance and its implicit guarantee of the FSLIC fund.  The case 
in favor of the incentive-conflict  model gains force from t-tests  for 
differences between the abnormal returns of the two groups.  These tests 
frequently detect differences of the size and sign predicted by the model. 
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Thursday, February 28, 1985 
Alexander Grant &  Co., ESM's  outside auditor, releases a "clean 
unqualified opinionn of ESM1s  1984 financial statements. 
Friday,  March 1,  1985 
Alexander Grant &  Co. withdraws ESM's  1984 financial statements, 
released the previous day.  Auditors scrutinize its books all weekend. 
Monday, March 4,  1985 
ESM1s  auditor says its financial statements Ifmay  not be relied upon," 
and ESM is ordered closed by a federal court.  The SEC files fraud 
charges and a federal district judge appoints a receiver. 
Wednesday, March 6,  1985 
A run on Home State begins, lasting through March 8. 
Friday,  March 8,  1985 
Home State borrows from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and 
announces that it will be closed Saturday, March 9. 
Saturday,  March 9,  1985 
Auditors report a $145 million insolvency at Home State,  which closes, 
driving the ODGF insolvent. 
Monday, March 11, 1985 
Runs continue on ODGF thrifts.  The Federal Reserve helps ODGF thrifts 
with document preparation to borrow from the discount window.  Mr. 
Thomas Tew, ESM1s  court-appointed  receiver, says that 13 local 
governments and customers of five ODGF institutions face losses of $315 
million. 
Wednesday, March 13, 1985 
A bill recapitalizing the ODGF with state funds is signed into law 
during the evening, but funding levels are grossly insufficient and 
heavy runs continue at four ODGF thrifts.  Federal Reserve Chairman 
Paul Volcker assures Ohio thrift executives that the Fed will provide 
cash advances at the discount rate. 
9"I'ursday, March 14, 1985 
Major runs occur at six ODGF thrifts.  The FSLIC offers insurance to 
ODGF institutions,  but capital hurdles are too high and the process 
could take months.  At an 8 p.m. press conference, Kenneth Cox, Ohio 
Director of Commerce, refuses to answer directly questions as to 
whether ODGF funds are unconditionally guaranteed by the state,  and 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board chairman Edwin Gray refuses to provide 
immediate backing to ODGF firms that want federal insurance. 
Friday,  March 15, 1985 
At a 7:30 a.m.  press conference,  Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste 
announces a Bank Holiday, to last "at  leastu  three days.  The State of 
Ohio refuses to put its full faith and credit behind the thrifts. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmMonday, March 18, 1985 
The Ohio legislature, acting on a Sunday request by Governor Celeste, 
passes a bill requiring ODGF thrifts to have federal insurance before 
they can reopen. 
Tuesday,  March 19, 1985 
The FSLIC promises to speed applications from ODGF thrifts, but imposes 
higher capital standards than those required for existing insured 
institutions. 
Wednesday,  March 20, 1985 
During the early morning, the Ohio legislature passes a bill allowing 
ODGF thrifts to open with the possibility of limited withdrawals, and 
indemnifying FSLIC for losses incurred in ODGF institutions through 
July 1,  1987.  Federal Reserve discount assistance is republicized. 
Thursday, April 4,  1985 
The Ohio legislature considers providing a financial guarantee of as 
much as $85 million to prospective buyers of Home State Savings Bank. 
Sources: Cooperman, Lee, and Wolfe  (1992),  Kane  (1992),  and various issues 
of Barronls,  the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1. Event Day: March 15, 1985 (ODGF  Bank Holiday), FDIC-insured ~irms 
Number of companies used in estimation:  123 
Average daily percent positive during the 
estimation period  (from 180 days prior to the 
event though 21 days prior to the event)  : 
Event 
Date  Day  Daily AAR  Z-Stat.  %  POS. 
Binomial 
Z-Statistic  CAR 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAverage percent prediction error for day -1  through day 0  =  -0.299 
Z-Statistic  for day -1  through day 0  =  -1.956* 
Percent positive prediction errors, day -1  through day 0  =  32  -520 
Binomial Z-statistic  for day -1  through day 0  =  -3.877* 
Average percent prediction error for day -5  through day 0  =  -0.166 
Z-Statistic  for day -5  through day 0  =  -0.152 
Average percent prediction error for day 1 through day 6  =  -0.494 
Z-Statistic  for day 1 through day 6  =  -3.021* 
Average percent prediction error for day -10  through day 0  =  0.194 
2-Statistic  for day -10  through day 0  =  1.435 
Average percent prediction error for day 1 through day 11  =  -0.339 
Z-Statistic  for day 1 through day 11  =  -1.482 
*  indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Event Day:  Day relative to the event date. 
Daily AAR:  Average abnormal return for the day. 
Z-Stat:  Z-statistic  testing the hypothesis that the Daily AAR is 
zero. 
%  Pos:  Percent of abnormal returns greater than zero on the day. 
Binomial Z-Stat:  Binomial statistic testing the hypothesis that the 
proportion of positive abnormal returns on the day is 
greater than the proportion during the estimation period. 
CAR:  Cumulative abnormal return. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2. Event Day: March 15, 1985 (ODGF  Bank ~oliday),  FSLIC-insured  Firms 
Number of companies used in estimation:  6  7 
Average daily percent positive during the 
estimation period (from 180 days prior to the 
event though 21 days prior to the event)  : 
Event 
Date  Day  ~ailyAAR Z-Stat.  %  Pos. 
Binomial 
Z-Statistic 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAverage percent prediction error for day -1  through day 0 
Z-Statistic  for day -1  through day 0 
Percent positive prediction errors, day -1  through day 0 
Binomial Z-statistic  for day -1  through day 0 
Average percent prediction error for day -5  through day 0 
Z-Statistic  for day -5  through day 0 
Average percent prediction error for day 1 through day 6 
Z-Statistic  for day 1 through day 6 
Average percent prediction error for day -10  through day 0 
Z-Statistic  for day -10  through day 0 
Average percent prediction error for day 1 through day 11 
Z-Statistic  for day 1 through day 11 
-  -  - 
*  indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Event Day:  Day relative to the event date. 
Daily AAR:  Average abnormal return for the day. 
Z-Stat:  Z-statistic  testing the hypothesis that the Daily AAR is zero. 
%  Pos:  Percent of abnormal returns greater than zero on the day. 
Binomial Z-Stat:  Binomial statistic testing the hypothesis that the proportion 
of positive abnormal returns on the day is greater than the 
proportion during the estimation period. 
CAR:  Cumulative abnormal return. 
In the rightmost column, positive values signify that the abnormal returns for 
FDIC institutions exceed the abnormal returns for FSLIC institutions. 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
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